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Preserving Confidentiality or Obstructing Justice?
Historical Perspectives on a Medical Privilege in Court
Andreas-Holger Maehle*
Professor of History of Medicine and Medical Ethics, Department of Philosophy,
Durham University
Abstract
An important problem for medical confidentiality in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was the question of whether doctors could be required
to give evidence in court about their patients’ condition. On the one hand, knowledge
that personal information might be divulged in open court might prevent patients
from consulting a doctor on sensitive illnesses, to the detriment of their health as well
as of public health. On the other hand, valuable evidence might be lost through exclu-
sion of medical testimony, perhaps even leading to errors of justice. This paper compares
the different approaches that have been taken to this problem in the United Kingdom,
the USA and Germany, and highlights key arguments, cases, and regulations that
have shaped the issue of a medical privilege in court. It shows that the origins of the
different routes taken – from rejection of a medical privilege to its inclusion in codes
of civil and criminal procedure – lay in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Moreover, it suggests that the treatment of confidentiality in court reflected the power
relations between the legal and medical professions.
Introduction
One of the main problems for medical confidentiality in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the question of whether doctors
could be required to give evidence in court about their patients’ condition. The
ethical duty of medical secrecy, expressed in the Hippocratic Oath,1 was widely
regarded as constitutive of the physician-patient relationship. It would encourage
patients to reveal details that would help the doctor in arriving at the right dia-
gnosis and in choosing the appropriate treatment. Such benefits of confiden-
DOI 10.7590/221354015X14319325750151*
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005) for a project on the history of medical confidentiality. My thanks go also to the Wellcome
Trust for its support of the symposium ‘Medical Confidentiality and Privacy: Past, Present and
Future’, Glasgow, 25-26 April 2014, at which I presented an earlier version of this paper.
‘What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard
to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding
1
such things shameful to be spoken about.’ (Translation by Ludwig Edelstein). For interpretations
of this section of the Oath, see Steven H. Miles, The Hippocratic Oath and the Ethics of Medicine
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), 149-157.
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tiality were seen in some jurisdictions as a reason to exempt doctors from
testifying to details of their patients in court. Knowledge that personal informa-
tion might be divulged in open court might prevent patients from consulting
a doctor on sensitive cases of illness, to the detriment of their health as well as
of public health. On the other hand, valuable evidence might be lost through
exclusion of medical testimony, perhaps even leading to judicial errors.
This conflict, between the court’s mission to establish the truth and the desire
to protect patients’ beneficial, fiduciary relationship with their doctor was at
the heart of many debates on medical confidentiality. Was a medical privilege
in court, that is, in this context, a right to refuse to give evidence, justifiable in
the same way as the recognized legal privilege which protected communications
between lawyer and client? Was the relationship between doctor and patient
comparable with that between priests and penitents? Should medical secrecy
be treated with the same respect as the seal of confession? This article discusses
the different approaches tackling the problem of medical confidentiality in
court, in Britain, the USA and Germany, and highlights the various arguments
adduced by legal and medical commentators.
Legal Preconditions in Britain, the United States,
and Germany
The question of a medical privilege first arose in late eight-
eenth-century England in the trial for bigamy of Elizabeth Chudleigh (1720-
1788), Duchess of Kingston.2 During this trial, held in 1776 before the House
of Peers, the Duchess’s surgeon and friend Caesar Hawkins (1711-1786) was
asked by Counsel for the Prosecution whether he had known of a previous
marriage between her and the naval officer August John Hervey. Hawkins, who
had been present at the birth of Chudleigh and Hervey’s child, was reluctant
to answer the question. Instead he raised the issue of medical confidentiality
by repeatedly saying: ‘I do not know how far any Thing, that has come before
me in a confidential Trust in my Profession, should be disclosed, consistent
with my professional Honour.’3 In response, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield (1705-
1793) made a statement that would set a precedent for centuries to come:
For discussion of this case, see Angus H. Ferguson, ‘The Lasting Legacy of a Bigamous
Duchess: The Benchmark Precedent for Medical Confidentiality’, Social History of Medicine 19
2
(2006), 37-53; A.H. Ferguson, Should A Doctor Tell? The Evolution of Medical Confidentiality in
Britain (Farnham & Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2013), 13-28; Danuta Mendelson, ‘The Duchess
of Kingston’s Case, the Ruling of Lord Mansfield and Duty of Medical Confidentiality in Court’,
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 35 (2012), 480-489.
The Trial of Elizabeth Duchess Dowager of Kingston for Bigamy, Before the Right Honourable The
House of Peers, in Westminister-Hall, in Full Parliament (…) Published by Order of the House of
3
Peers (London: Charles Bathurst 1776), 119; Thomas Bayly Howell, AComplete Collection of State
Trials, vol. 20 (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees etc. 1816), 572.
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‘if all your Lordships acquiesce, Mr. Hawkins will understand, that it is your
Judgment and Opinion, that a Surgeon has no Privilege, where it is a material
Question, in a Civil or Criminal Cause, to know whether Parties were married,
or whether a Child was born, to say, that his Introduction to the Parties was in
the Course of his Profession, and in that Way he came to the Knowledge of it.
(…) If a Surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these Secrets, to be sure he would be
guilty of a Breach of Honour, and of great Indiscretion; but, to give that Infor-
mation in a Court of Justice, which by the Law of the Land he is bound to do,
will never be imputed to him as any Indiscretion whatever.’4
None of the Lords objected, and Hawkins subsequently gave evidence. The
Duchess of Kingston was eventually found guilty of bigamy.5
With Lord Mansfield’s statement, a privilege for medical men to refuse to
give evidence about their patients had been rejected in the highest English
court. Although occasionally judges lamented the fact that the law of privilege
did not extend to medical persons (e.g. Mr Justice Buller in Wilson v. Rastall
1792),6 Lord Mansfield’s opinion was adopted in most English courts, turning
it into a principle of common law.7 It became also accepted in Scots law, partic-
ularly after Lord Fullerton as one of the judges in a relevant case heard in the
Scottish Court of Session (AB v. CD 1851) had endorsed it. This case, in which
a doctor was sued for breach of medical confidentiality, established on the other
hand that secrecy was an integral part of the contract between a medical man
and his client.8
While in Britain the rejection of a medical privilege in court seems – initially
– to have met little opposition, the issue developed differently in the United
The Trial of Elizabeth (note 3), 120; Howell (note 3), 573.4
Ferguson, ‘Lasting Legacy’ (note 2), 45-46.5
Buller cited in Howell (note 3), 575-576: ‘There are cases, to which it is much to be lamented
that the law of privilege is not extended: those in which medical persons are obliged to disclose
6
the information, which they acquire by attending in their professional characters. This point
was very much considered in the duchess of Kingston’s Case, where sir C. Hawkins, who had
attended the duchess as a medical person, made the objection himself, but was over-ruled, and
compelled to give evidence against the prisoner.’
John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 4
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company 1905), 3347-3348; W.A. Purrington, ‘An Abused Privilege’,
Columbia Law Review 6 (1906), 390-392.
7
Ferguson, ‘Lasting Legacy’ (note 2), 47-48; A.H. Ferguson, ‘Exploring the Myth of a Scottish
Privilege: A Comparison of the Early Development of the Law on Medical Confidentiality in
8
Scotland and England’, in: Mark Freeman, Eleanor Gordon & Krista Maglen (ed.), Medicine,
Law and Public Policy in Scotland c. 1850-1990. Essays Presented to Anne Crowther (Dundee:
Dundee University Press 2011), 130.
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States. In 1828 the state of New York was the first to enact a statute against
disclosure of confidential patient information in court:
‘No person duly authorized to practice physic [i.e. medicine] or surgery, shall
be allowed to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending
any patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary
to enable him to prescribe for such a patient as a physician or to do any act for
him as a surgeon.’9
The commissioners responsible for the revision of the statutes of New York
gave two reasons for this rule. First, they argued that in comparison with the
established privilege for communications between attorney and client, which
enabled proper preparation for legal proceedings, consultations with a medical
adviser were even more deserving of protection against disclosure. Without it,
people would refrain from seeking the medical help they needed. Secondly,
driven by a sense of professional honour, medical men might be tempted to
conceal the truth if they were compelled to give evidence about confidential
patient details.10
By 1889, 20 American states or territories had introduced similar statutes
restricting or prohibiting disclosure of patients’ details in court by their physi-
cians or surgeons, unless the patient had consented to it or medical confidenti-
ality had been waived. Often, the rules for a medical privilege were set alongside
those that protected communications between attorneys and their clients and
confessions made to clergymen or priests.11 The other states continued to follow
the English common law rule that there were no restrictions on disclosure of
patient details in court.12
N.Y. Rev. Stats. 1st ed. Vol. 2, p. 406, Pt. III, Ch. VII, Tit. III, Art. 8, Sec. 73. Cf. Purrington
(note 7), 392. See also Ralph Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality. Testimonial Privileged
9
Communication, Breach of Confidentiality, and Reporting Duties (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C.
Thomas 1998), 22.
Commissioners on Revision of the Statutes of New York, III, 737 (1836). Cited in Wigmore
(note 7), 3349-3350.
10
G.W. Field & John B. Uhle, ‘Privileged Communications’, The American Law Register 37 (1889),
1-21. By September 1895, the number of states or territories recognizing medical privilege had
11
further increased to 25: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Tracy C. Becker, ‘Observations concerning the Law of Privileged Communications
between Physician and Patient, as Applicable to the Duties of Railway Surgeons’, Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA) 26 (1896), 1065-1066.
At the time no restrictions on the disclosures that a physician could be compelled to make in
court existed in Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
12
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Ver-
mont, Virginia, and West Virginia. Cf. Charles A. Boston, ‘The Law of Evidence concerning
Confidential Communications between Physician and Patient’, in: R.A. Witthaus & Tracy C.
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The formulation of the relevant statutes varied from state to state, leaving
room for different interpretations. For example, the scope of information which
was necessary for a doctor to treat a patient, and which was thus protected, was
controversial. Moreover, physicians or surgeons consulted for the means of
procuring an abortion could in some states be forced to testify about this, re-
gardless of general medical privilege in court. Abortion, then classed as a crime,
was not meant to be ‘shielded’ by medical confidentiality.13 In some states
(California, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, and Washington) the statutory medical privilege applied only to civil ac-
tions.14 Finally, if a patient sought damages from her physician for malpractice,15
or from another party for personal injury, and for this purpose had revealed in
court full details of her condition and treatment, she could not then prevent
her physician from giving evidence.16
The New York statute itself was revised several times in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.17 The revisions provided the option for patients
or their attorneys to issue waivers of confidentiality in trials,18 and permitted
doctors to give evidence on the previous mental or physical state of a deceased
patient with the consent of a relevant relative, as long as the information did
not include confidential communications or facts that might disgrace the
memory of the patient.19 In 1904, nurses were included under the medical
Becker (ed.), Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, vol. 1 (New York: William
Wood & Company 1894), 94.
Field and Uhle (note 11), 11-12; ‘Medical Confidences’, JAMA 33 (1899), 1431.13
Becker (note 11), 1066; Boston (note 12), 96; Samuel I. Jacobs, ‘Evidence: Privileged Commu-
nications between Physician and Patient in California: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1881 (4)’, California
Law Review 20 (1932), 304.
14
Medical malpractice suits became frequent in America from the 1840s; see James C. Mohr,
‘American Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective’, JAMA 283 (2000), 1731-
1737.
15
‘Privilege Waived by Bringing of Action for Malpractice – Evidence of Defense by Medical So-
ciety not Admissible’, JAMA 58 (1912), 511; ‘Construction of Statute Relative to Privileged
16
Communications – What Adjudged Waivers – Application to Several Physicians’, JAMA 61
(1913), 1837-1838; ‘Privileged Communications Under Amended Statute’, JAMA 64 (1915), 1446;
‘Waiver of Privilege by Plaintiffs’, JAMA 79 (1922), 2250; ‘Waiver of Privilege in Personal Injury
Case’, JAMA 80 (1923), 1172; ‘When Doctrine of “Res Ipsa Loquitur” Applies’, JAMA 91 (1928),
1919-1920; Hugh Emmett Culbertson, Medical Men and the Law: A Modern Treatise on the Legal
Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Physicians and Surgeons (Philadelphia and New York: Lea & Fe-
biger 1913), 299-300; Lloyd Paul Stryker,Courts andDoctors (New York: The Macmillan Company
1932), 34-40.
Specifically: in 1891, 1892, 1899, and 1904. See Purrington (note 7), 402-403; ‘Privileged
Communications’, JAMA 62 (1914), 1351.
17
‘Physical Examination and Privilege Waiving’, JAMA 48 (1907), 903.18
Boston (note 12), 98, 107-108; Stryker (note 16), 38-39. In contrast to this, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin took the view that only the patient can waive the privilege of secrecy and that
19
therefore after the patient’s death ‘the physician’s lips are forever sealed under all circumstances’.
Cf. ‘Wisconsin Doctrine as to Privileged Communications’, JAMA 47 (1904), 1577. In the same
vein, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled in a case of contested will that it was error to
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privilege in court, and in 1905 an addition was made, compelling disclosure of
information when a crime against a child under the age of sixteen was suspec-
ted.20
In Germany, yet another approach was taken towards the question of med-
ical secrecy. Prussian regulations forbidding medical personnel from disclosing
private details of their patients had existed since the eighteenth century. The
Medical Edict of 1725 ruled that ‘medical men must not reveal to anyone the
secret faults and ailments which they have discovered’.21 A more comprehensive
regulation was included in the Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht (Prussian
General Law) of 1794, determining that doctors, surgeons and midwives must
not reveal ‘ailments and family secrets that come to their knowledge, as long
as these are not crimes’.22
Subsequent legislation was influenced by the French Code pénal (1810) which
in its article 378 required secrecy of doctors, surgeons, pharmacists, midwives
and others who obtained confidential information through their profession,
unless disclosure was demanded by law. Punishment for violation of this article
could range from one to six months’ imprisonment or fines between 100 and
500 francs.23 Section 155 of the Prussian Penal Code of 1851 similarly ruled that
‘medical persons and their helpers’ and others were punishable with imprison-
ment up to three months or a fine up to 500 thaler if they disclosed ‘without
authorization’ secrets which had been entrusted to them due to their office,
profession or trade.24 Some other German states, for example Hanover (1840),
Hessen (1841) and Nassau (1849), punished breaches of confidentiality only if
they had been made with malicious intent or in order to gain unlawful advan-
tage.25 After unification of the German states, the new Reich Penal Code of 1871
followed the Prussian model in its section 300. Including the legal as well as
the health professions it ruled:
admit the testimony of a physician about the deceased patient’s senile dementia. Cf. ‘Statutes
Relative to Privileged Communications and Vital Statistics’, JAMA 79 (1922), 325.
Purrington (note 7), 403.20
Bjarne Exner, Das Berufsgeheimnis des Arztes gemäß § 300 des Str. G. B. (Jur. Diss., Ruprecht-
Carls-Universität Heidelberg 1909), 11.
21
Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht, Teil 2, Tit. 20, § 505. Cf. Siegfried Placzek,Das Berufsgeheimnis
des Arztes, 3rd enlarged and revised edition (Leipzig: Georg Thieme 1909), 2.
22
Ibid., 49. The French legal requirement of professional secrecy was taken to be ‘absolute’, ap-
plying also to evidence in criminal trials. See for example: ‘Professional Secrecy’, JAMA 35
23
(1900), 104. For a discussion of medical confidentiality in France, see Raymond Villey, Histoire
du Secret Médical (Paris: Seghers 1986).
Placzek (note 22), 7.24
Ibid., 4-5.25
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‘Lawyers, advocates, notaries, counsels for the defence, physicians, surgeons,
midwives, apothecaries, as well as the assistants of these persons are punished
with a fine of up to 1500 Mark or imprisonment up to three months, if they
reveal without authorization private secrets which have been entrusted to them
due to their office, profession or trade.’26
The confidentiality of professionals was thus in Germany a general legal
duty. Breaches of professional secrecy were punishable under the rules of the
Penal Code, unless disclosure had been authorized by the entrusting patient
or client, or if it was required by law. Legal exceptions to the duty of secrecy
pertained to knowledge about plans for serious crimes (section 139 of the Penal
Code) including treason, counterfeiting, murder, robbery and abduction, as
well as a possible bomb attack (section 13 of the Explosives Law of 1884).27 Re-
porting to the police or the warning of relevant persons was meant to prevent
these crimes. Doctors were also obliged to notify the health authorities of spe-
cific infectious diseases under the Law for the Combat of Dangerous Diseases
of 1900.28 In addition, they had to provide official lists of vaccinated persons
under the law on compulsory vaccination against smallpox (1874).29 Finally,
doctors had to report births (if they had been present at them) to the registrar,
and directors of mental asylums had to notify the authorities of admitted pa-
tients.30
Initially, it was unclear whether doctors were entitled to refuse to give evid-
ence in court on the grounds of section 300. However, with the Codes of
Criminal Procedure (section 52) and Civil Procedure (section 348) of 1877, which
came into effect in 1879, German doctors became entitled to refuse to give
testimony regarding private details of their patients – unless the patient con-
cerned had waived medical confidentiality, in which case the doctor had to
testify.31 Section 300 did not apply to legal cases in which a doctor faced charges
of malpractice or was accused of demanding excessive fees. Here, the doctor
Cf. Reichs-Strafgesetzbuch (RStGB), § 300. Cf. Placzek (note 22), 2.26
Ibid., 29.27
Gesetz, betr. die Bekämpfung gemeingefährlicher Krankheiten, 30 June 1900. Cf. Placzek
(note 22), 30.
28
Exner (note 21), 41; Hans Weizmann, Das Berufsgeheimnis (§ 300 RStGB.) (Jur. Diss., Universität
Breslau 1909), 25.
29
Heinrich Schmidt, Das ärztliche Berufsgeheimnis (Jur. Diss., Universität Leipzig; Jena: Gustav
Fischer 1907), 19-20.
30
J. Liebmann, Die Pflicht des Arztes zur Bewahrung anvertrauter Geheimnisse (Frankfurt a. M.:
Joseph Baer & Co. 1886), 6-8; Placzek (note 22), 32.
31
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could reveal, without the patient’s consent, details of the treatment that were
necessary for his defence, or to justify his claims.32
If one compares these legal preconditions for medical confidentiality in
court in Britain, the United States and Germany in the nineteenth century, it
appears that Germany, with its legal recognition of patients’ interest in secrecy,
provided the strongest protections, and Britain, with its precedents of rejecting
a medical privilege, the weakest. The USA seem to have taken an intermediate
position, particularly if one considers that only about half of the states or terri-
tories enacted medical privilege statutes and that in some states these statutes
pertained to civil actions only. The role of the doctor on the witness stand re-
mained contested.
American Debates on Confidentiality in Court
As mentioned above, unease about the rejection of a medical
privilege in British courts had occasionally been expressed even from within
the legal profession. William Mawdesley Best (1809-1869), in his handbook
The Principles of the Law of Evidence, characterized this practice as ‘a rule harsh
in itself, of questionable policy, and at variance with the practice in France, and
in some of the United States of America’.33 This opinion contrasted, however,
with the views of several American legal experts who criticized the New York
statute and its successors. For example, New York barrister Charles A. Boston
held that the statutes ‘have not proved an unalloyed benefit, and some of their
features have brought about conditions which in some cases have embarrassed
the administration of justice’.34 Concerning the New York statute he highlighted
the fact that it prevented a physician from ‘disclosing the condition of his patient
who is a lunatic or habitual drunkard’ as well as from stating a patient’s cause
of death, and that it excluded much testimony which might have demonstrated
fraud in insurance cases.35 Similar concerns were expressed by barrister William
Archer Purrington (1852-1926). He claimed that the introduction of the medical
Important for this view was a decision of the District Court of Hamburg on 24 June 1899; see
W. Mittermaier, ‘Gutachten über § 300 R.St.G.B.’,Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft
32
21 (1902), 229-230. See also Friedrich Ottomar Jummel, Der § 300 Str.G.B., ein Versuch seiner
Auslegung (Jur. Diss., Universität Leipzig 1903), 54.
William Mawdesley Best, The Principles of the Law of Evidence with Elementary Rules for Conducting
the Examination and Cross-Examination of Witnesses, first American, from the sixth London
33
edition of John A. Russell, by James Appleton Morgan, vol. 2 (New York: Cockcroft & Company
1878), 987-988. Best’s handbook saw twelve editions. In addition to publication in Britain and
the USA, it was also published in India and Germany.
Boston (note 12), 134.34
Ibid.35
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privilege in New York and other states had opened the door to fraud. In his ex-
perience, in some legal actions brought to recover damages for physical injuries,
the medical privilege had been used to suppress the ‘best available evidence’ if
this was in the plaintiff’s interest. He therefore called for changing, if not alto-
gether repealing, the privilege statute.36
John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943), Professor of the Law of Evidence at
Northwestern University, asked in 1905 four critical general questions about
privilege for communications between doctor and patient:
‘[1] Does the communication originate in a confidence? [2] Is the inviolability
of that confidence vital to the due attainment of the purposes of the relation of
physician and patient? [3] Is the relation one that should be fostered? [4] Is the
expected injury to the relation, through disclosure, greater than the expected
benefit to justice?’37
Wigmore answered only the third question in the affirmative. Regarding
the first question, he maintained that only in a few instances, such as venereal
disease and abortion, had patients any real interest in keeping their condition
secret. Concerning the second question he argued that the possibility of disclo-
sure in court would not deter people from seeking medical help. Polemically
he asked: ‘Is it noted in medical chronicles that, after the privilege was estab-
lished in New York, the floodgates of patronage were let open upon the medical
profession, and long concealed ailments were then for the first time brought
forth to receive the blessings of cure?’38 Finally, he answered the fourth question
by claiming that ‘injury to justice by the repression of the facts of corporal injury
and disease’ was ‘a hundred fold greater than any injury which might be done
by disclosure’, particularly in divorce proceedings and in cases of criminal
abortion.39
On the other hand, from the side of the medical profession, it was maintained
that the ‘machinery for the conviction and punishment of crime’ operated as
well in those states that had medical privilege in court as in those that had not.
This point was made by Daniel R. Brower, Professor of Mental Diseases at Rush
Medical College, Chicago, and Northwestern University, in an address to the
Purrington (note 7), 393-394, 422. See also William A. Purrington, ‘Of Certain Legal Relations
of Physicians and Surgeons to Their Patients and to One Another’, in: Allan McLane Hamilton
36
& Lawrence Godkin (ed.), A System of Legal Medicine (1894), 2nd edn, vol. 1 (New York: E. B.
Treat & Co. 1900), 626.
Wigmore (note 7), 3350. See also Daniel W. Shuman, ‘The Origins of the Physician-Patient
Privilege and Professional Secret’, Southwestern Law Journal 39 (1985/86), 663.
37
Wigmore (note 7), 3350.38
Ibid., 3351.39
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local Medico-Legal Society in 1896. Brower argued here for the introduction of
statutory medical privilege also in the state of Illinois. He claimed that his
medical colleagues in the Society would rather go to prison for contempt of
court than violate secrecy and expose the character of their patients in a court
of law.40
However, the opposition to medical privilege by some members of the legal
profession made it difficult for physicians to achieve legislation on this matter.
In January 1897, physician F.L. Hall of Perry, Illinois, a member of the Legis-
lature, introduced a bill providing for medical secrecy along the lines of the
New York statute.41 By the end of May, his colleague John B. Hamilton, Professor
of Surgery at Rush Medical College, had to report that Hall’s bill had already
failed at the committee stage. With bitter irony, Hamilton described how ‘an
old lawyer with snowy looks and hands trembling with age wrought himself
into a storm of passion in denouncing it’, and how the ‘awe-struck committee,
conscience-smitten for having for a moment dared to look at a bill introduced
by a physician’ brought the proposal down.42 At about the same time, physician
James B. Baird campaigned in Georgia for the enactment of a medical privilege
statute. Emphasizing the fact that 20 American states had by then such regula-
tions, he claimed that public opinion was ‘decidedly in favor of protecting the
professional secrets of physicians’.43
Views on what the public thought about the need for protecting medical
confidentiality in court were thus contradictory. Baird’s assessment of public
opinion on this question contrasted with that of Wigmore who held that most
people did not worry about this matter. Nevertheless, the intensity of the medico-
legal debate on this issue during the 1890s suggests that it may have been
fuelled by more general concerns about privacy – at least among the social and
intellectual elite.
In December 1890 the now famous article ‘The Right to Privacy’ by Boston
attorneys Samuel Warren (1852-1910) and Louis Brandeis (1856-1941) was pub-
lished in the Harvard Law Review.44 Drawing upon English legal cases they ar-
Daniel R. Brower, ‘The Necessity of Granting Privileged Communications to the Medical
Profession in the State of Illinois’, JAMA 27 (1896), 1271-1273.
40
‘Professional Communications to Physicians Should Be Privileged’, JAMA 28 (1897), 374.41
John B. Hamilton, ‘“Medical” Legislation and How to Obtain It’, JAMA 28 (1897), 1005-1006.42
James B. Baird, ‘The Medical Witness. His Rights and Wrongs in Courts of Justice’, JAMA 32
(1899), 1149.
43
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, Harvard Law Review 4 (1890),
193-220.
44
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gued for recognition of an individual’s ‘right to be let alone’.45 It has been said
that the immediate occasion for writing on privacy was Warren’s annoyance
about newspaper reports on his and his wife’s glamorous dinner parties, and
the main thrust of the article aimed at the practices of the press, including the
use of photographs made with the then newly available ‘snap cameras’.46 Warren
and Brandeis described, however, a much more general need for privacy in
modern, complex society, and recognized that invasion of an individual’s privacy
caused ‘mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury’.47 While disclosure of patients’ secrets was not directly discussed
by them,48 their general assessment of people’s need for ‘solitude and privacy’
indicated a contemporary social climate that was conducive to protecting med-
ical secrecy.
How did this American debate compare with the situation in Germany,
which, as we have seen, protected professional secrecy through its Penal Code,
and in Britain, where a medical privilege in court had been rejected?
Medical Privilege in Germany
In the immediate years after the regulation of professional
secrecy through section 300 of the Reich Penal Code, doctors’ communications
with their patients were still unprotected in court. While lawyers and priests
were not required to testify, physicians and surgeons could be forced to give
evidence about their patients. In 1875, a decision of the Reich Justice Commis-
sion (Reichsjustizkommission) planned a right to compel any expert to testify in
court, because the expert ‘owed his knowledge to the state’. From the perspective
of the medical profession this was an unjustified expropriation of intellectual
property.49 Eventually, from 1879 onwards, section 52 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and section 348 of the Code of Civil Procedure granted doctors the
Whether the cases cited by Warren and Brandeis were actually precedents showing a right to
privacy is questionable, because the decisions in these cases were largely based on property
45
rights. See Walter F. Pratt, Privacy in Britain (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, and London:
Associated University Presses 1979), 19-37.
Ibid., 19; Raymond Wacks, Privacy and Media Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013),
53.
46
Warren and Brandeis (note 44), 196.47
They briefly referred though to the hypothetical example of Lord Eldon in 1820, that ‘if one of
the late king’s [George III] physicians had kept a diary of what he heard and saw, the court
48
would not, in the king’s lifetime, have permitted him to print and publish it’. Warren and
Brandeis (note 44), 205.
Krahmer, ‘Der Zeugnisszwang der Aerzte’, Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift 1875, no. 26-27:
365-366, 378.
49
101Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 2015-1-2
PRESERVING CONFIDENTIALITY OR OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE?
‘entitlement’ to refuse to give evidence in court on the grounds of their legal
duty of professional secrecy according to section 300 of the Penal Code.50
However, this situation raised the question of whether they were obliged to
make use of this entitlement, or whether they could choose to testify without
their patient’s consent. Some legal authors held that doctors did risk punishment
under section 300 if they gave evidence without permission of the patient.51
Other legal commentators took the view, however, that giving evidence in court,
at the request of a judge, could never be an illegal act.52 The German Supreme
Court (Reichsgericht) confirmed in a decision in 1889 that a doctor was free to
decide in each particular case, according to his own ‘dutiful judgment and dis-
cretion’, whether he wanted to testify concerning his patient or not.53
Yet, in German legal practice, the entitlement of doctors to refuse to give
evidence in court was not accepted without challenge. For example, more than
20 years after the Code of Civil Procedure had come into force, a Hamburg
physician was involved as a witness in a protracted divorce case that led to two
decisions of the German Supreme Court regarding his medical privilege.
Steadfastly refusing to give evidence about the alleged venereal disease of the
husband on the grounds of medical confidentiality, the doctor was convicted
twice by the Higher District Court of Hamburg and ordered to testify. The Su-
preme Court twice lifted the lower court’s verdict and eventually ruled in
January 1903 that the doctor was indeed entitled to refuse to give evidence.54
The case illustrated how the implementation of the legal entitlement of
German doctors to refuse to give testimony could be controversial, but was
eventually assured by the highest court, at least for civil proceedings. In its
reasons for the verdict, however, the Supreme Court admitted that there might
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be cases in which ‘higher moral duties’ could overrule the duty of confidentiality.
As an example the court suggested that a doctor may feel obliged to inform a
wife of the venereal disease of her husband in order to protect her against infec-
tion as far as possible. Going a step further, the court did not even rule out a
moral duty to inform a third party other than the wife.55
Despite the relative clarity of the German law on professional secrecy,
medical confidentiality was open to legal challenges. How, in comparison, were
British doctors treated when they were reluctant to give confidential information
in testimony?
The Lack of a Medical Privilege in Britain
Based on the precedent of the Duchess of Kingston case,
doctors in Britain were still compelled to give evidence on patient details in the
late nineteenth century. A characteristic scenario was the one experienced by
the London obstetrician John Braxton Hicks (1823-1897). In a divorce case, he
was subpoenaed in order to testify about a consultation of the husband who, a
year earlier, had come to see him with worries that he might have infected his
then pregnant wife with gonorrhoea. Reluctant to speak, Hicks asked the court
whether the husband’s communication to him might be privileged, but was
told that it was not, and he subsequently gave evidence. Hicks was particularly
annoyed that he was put in a situation in which he was forced to provide a
testimony that, in effect, was equivalent to a self-incrimination of one of his
clients (that is, the husband).56
In the contemporary British medico-legal and ethical literature doctors were
advised to testify only after a ruling of the judge to this effect,57 or even to refuse
to give evidence altogether, risking a prison sentence for contempt of court.58
As Justice Sir Henry Hawkins (1817-1907) emphasized during a prominent libel
case against the obstetrician William Smoult Playfair (1835-1903) in 1896 (Kitson
v. Playfair), the question of privilege was for the judge to decide, depending on
Entscheidungen des Reichsgericht in Civilsachen 53 (1903), 317-318.55
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the particular circumstances of a case.59 Usually, this meant that the doctor
concerned was compelled to testify. Only exceptionally did a judge exempt a
doctor from giving evidence, as happened in a matrimonial case before Notting-
ham magistrates in 1900. Here, the medical evidence might have incriminated
the female defendant, and the judge recognized the doctor’s concerns that dis-
closure might make him liable to action by the defendant as well as by his
professional body, the General Medical Council.60
In fact, in the previous year, the General Medical Council issued a memor-
andum on professional secrecy of medical practitioners prepared by its legal
assessor, Muir Mackenzie.61 Briefly reviewing the relevant legal cases since the
trial of the Duchess of Kingston, Mackenzie concluded that ‘a medical man not
only may, but must, if necessary, violate professional confidences when answer-
ing questions material to an issue in a court of law’.62 Moreover, he warned
that ‘circumstances which according to the custom of the medical profession
might be deemed to exonerate him [that is, a medical man] from the imputation
of improper violation of secrecy might nevertheless in a court of law be deemed
an insufficient justification’.63 The circumstances referred to were criminal
communications and protection of a doctor’s own wife and children.64 British
doctors were thus in a position where they could be forced to give evidence in
court, but were simultaneously expected to observe strict confidentiality in daily
life. A breach of confidentiality could result in charges of slander or libel, and
might end with a verdict to pay considerable damages to the patient, as it had
happened in the Playfair case.65
The issue of medical privilege in court became prominent again after World
War I when the number of divorce petitions soared. Typically, medical evidence
was sought in such cases to prove that a husband had acquired venereal disease
outside marriage and subsequently infected the wife. In this way the wife could
provide the required proof of adultery and cruelty. With the Public Health
‘Kitson v. Playfair and Wife’, The Times, 26 March and 28 March 1896. For a discussion of this
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(Venereal Diseases) Regulations of 1916, the English government had established
special VD treatment centres which guaranteed confidentiality. This circum-
stance made the requirement of disclosure in court especially problematic for
those doctors who worked at these centres and were subpoenaed to give evidence
in divorce trials. Two cases, Garner v. Garner (1920) and Needham v. Needham
(1921), were particularly relevant in this context. In the first case, Mr Justice
Henry Alfred McCardie (1869-1933) did not recognize the doctor’s protest,
stating that there were ‘higher considerations’ in a court of law than those per-
taining to the position of medical men.66 In the second case, Mr Justice Horridge
did not regard the authority of the 1916 VD Regulations as sufficient to justify
medical privilege in court.67 In both cases the doctors concerned eventually
gave the required evidence.
Attempts by the Ministry of Health to secure medical privilege for civil
proceedings failed due to resistance of the judiciary, led by the Lord Chancellor,
Viscount Birkenhead (F.E. Smith, 1872-1930).68 The influence of the British
Medical Association in the matter was hampered by internal differences of
opinion.69 In 1922, Birkenhead published a strong defence of the traditional
view that doctors had no privilege in court and had to support the administration
of justice. In his opinion, ‘to establish a class who may at their will assist or
obstruct the judges in their work would be a retrograde step not justified by
any argument which has been brought forward’.70
Indeed, in another divorce trial, in Birmingham in 1927, Mr Justice McCardie
again demonstrated his uncompromising position: he compelled medical
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evidence on the husband’s alleged venereal disease, regardless of the govern-
mental guarantee of confidentiality in VD treatment centres, and against the
protest of the medical staff concerned.71 Speaking subsequently to the Medico-
Legal Society, McCardie further defended his position. As the London corres-
pondent of the Journal of the American Medical Association reported the judge’s
speech:
‘There were two aspects of the question [of medical secrecy], each of which
was vital. There was the physician who said, “Health, health, health, and break
down the legal obstacles that prevent the gain of health.” Yes, but there was
another point of view – and there was not a lawyer whose heart was not stirred
– and that was “Truth, truth, truth; open the shutters and let in the full light of
truth. Truth lay at the root of criminal justice.”’72
A private member’s bill to allow medical privilege regarding VD cases, in-
troduced into Parliament in 1927 by the dermatologist and MP for the University
of London, Ernest Gordon Graham-Little (1867-1950), was unsuccessful, as was
his second attempt in 1936/37 with a bill for wider medical privilege. Lacking
ministerial support and unclear in its potential consequences, Graham-Little’s
initiative failed under the pressure of legal criticisms.73 Cases such as that of
Garner v. Garner had set important new precedents for the lack of a medical
privilege in British courts. The case is still cited nowadays on this point.74
Conclusions
As this article has shown, the course of policies regarding
medical confidentiality in court in Britain, the USA and Germany was deter-
mined by decisions or regulations reaching back to the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. In all three countries, the question of medical privilege
was to some extent contested, but the outcomes established by the early twentieth
century differed considerably. Although British medical practitioners, when
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called as witnesses, repeatedly tried to maintain secrecy about private patient
details, judges compelled them to testify on the basis of legal precedent and the
view that the evidence was material to the case concerned. In the USA, by the
turn of the twentieth century about half of the states had followed the example
of New York and had adopted statutes that restricted disclosure of patient infor-
mation in court by their physician or surgeon, but exceptions were widely re-
cognized.75 This was especially true for criminal cases, such as illegal abortion,
where the ethical duty of confidentiality was overridden by the interest in pro-
secution. In civil actions, there was considerable concern in the legal profession
that the medical privilege was abused to commit fraud, especially in insurance
cases. In Germany, doctors’ entitlement, from the late 1870s onwards, to refuse
to give evidence in criminal as well as civil cases did not prevent serious legal
challenges which went right up to the Supreme Court. Eventually, however,
medical secrecy was protected by the German courts on the basis of section
300 of the Reich Penal Code, unless there was a ‘higher moral duty’ that might
justify disclosure, for example, warning the wife of a syphilitic husband of the
danger of infection.
The different situations for doctors in British, American and German courts
ultimately resulted from the different power relations between the medical and
legal professions. Whereas in Britain the judiciary’s interests dominated med-
ical attempts to protect confidentiality, a more balanced relationship between
the two professions in Germany led to recognition and confirmation of medical
privilege in court. The United States, with about half of states adopting medical
privilege and the other half still adhering to the English common law rule,
seemed to reflect, apart from differences in the influence of the local medical
profession, the outcome of efforts of traditionalist forces in law to withstand
the modernizing example of the New York statute of 1828. Even in those
American states that had enacted privilege for communications with physicians
and surgeons there was considerable uncertainty about the specific circum-
stances in legal cases to which it applied or in which it might be regarded as
implicitly waived.76 In all three countries, secrecy was an important asset for
the medical profession that set it apart from unlicensed practitioners. Besides
confidentiality’s importance for maintaining the trust between doctor and pa-
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tient, a right to remain silent in court reflected a claim to a status that equalled
that of the legal profession. Finally, towards the end of the nineteenth century,
recognition of an individual’s general right to privacy began to provide an addi-
tional argument for protecting the medical secret against disclosure.
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